In Defense of Pete Carroll and Darrell Bevell

All you’re hearing today is debate over Pete Carroll and Darrell Bevell’s decision to throw a slant route with Seattle a mere yard away from capturing a second consecutive Super Bowl title. Actually, that’s not entirely true. A debate has to have two sides and, so far, I have yet to see anyone other than ESPN analyst Danny Kanell defend Pete Carroll, a man whom I believe is being wrongfully skewered for making a sound football decision.

Let’s re-visit the situation. There were 26 seconds remaining on the clock and the Seahawks had one timeout remaining, both of which are vital pieces of information toward understanding Carroll and Bevell’s ultimately inauspicious joint venture. The Patriots lined up with seven men on the line, with linebacker Donta’ Hightower representing an eighth man lurking just behind the A gap. To Wilson, this is an easy read. The Patriots either are dropping these linemen into coverage, and thus taking away any chance they have at defending the run, or they are playing man coverage. And, as it turns out, the Patriots were playing man coverage.

On this play, Darrelle Revis lined up opposite Doug Baldwin. Trapped on Revis Island all day with only a temporary escape buoyed by a referee pick, Baldwin was not a reasonable option on this play. That is why Carroll smartly deployed him on an isolated side of the field, rendering the Patriots’ best defensive player obsolete for this play. On the other side, Jermaine Kearse and Ricardo Lockette lined up in a stack look. It’s important to note that Lockette is lined up as the Z receiver on this play, making him impossible to jam with a yard to go. It’s even more important to note who is covering Lockette—Malcolm Butler, an undrafted rookie.

Was Pete Carroll's boneheaded decision really a good decision with a bad result?

Malcolm Butler is the fifth cornerback on the Patriots roster. He was not supposed to play meaningful snaps in the Super Bowl. But with normally-reliable slot cornerback Kyle Arrington struggling mightily all day, Bill Belichick inserted Butler into the lineup due to his quickness advantage over dime back Logan Ryan. Aside from Chris Matthews, Seattle’s receivers are more quick than big, so this was a sensible deployment by Belichick.

It’s also very important to keep in mind what occurred two plays before. Still haunted by the specter of David Tyree and Mario Manningham, the Patriots were again burned by a miracle catch, this time by Seattle’s Jermaine Kearse. Who was covering him on that play? None other than Malcolm Butler, a player who wasn’t even supposed to be a part of the game plan. Oh, and did I mention he’s an UNDRAFTED ROOKIE playing in the Super Bowl?

                

Empowered by Butler’s presumed skill and confidence deficiencies coupled with the obvious man coverage read, Wilson confidently stepped into his 21^st pass attempt of the night. Everything was set up perfectly for Seattle. It was man coverage on a slant route one yard away from the end zone. The probability of intercepting this type pass is infinitesimal even for the best ball hawks in the game, let alone an unheralded rookie corner. But sometimes players make miracle plays, just as Kearse had two plays prior. Butler, aided by Brandon Browner’s stiff denial of Kearse’s attempt to set a pick on Butler, flew to the ball like a hawk, snatching the ball out of the air and deflating Seattle’s title hopes in the process. (Sorry, I couldn’t help myself with the deflating comment.)

                

Now, here is where you yell: “YOU HAVE A GUY NAMED BEAST MODE! YOU HAVE TO GIVE HIM THE BALL!” To which I reply, you had 26 seconds left with one timeout. Most of the consternation surrounding this play lies in the false belief that a Lynch touchdown was inevitable, as preordained as death and taxes. But let me deconstruct that belief. Again, the Patriots had eight men ready to stop Lynch. It’s vital to understand not just that Seattle is a great running team, but why it is a great running team, and what its fundamental weaknesses are.

                

The Seahawks, like so many teams, run the much ballyhooed zone-blocking scheme. Their offensive line is not predicated on power; it is predicated on a savvy scheme. Just because Marshawn Lynch is a power back does not mean that Seattle’s offensive line thrives with power blocks. That is an important distinction to make. Let me throw a statistic your way that Danny Kanell shared this morning: Marshawn Lynch was only 1 for 5 this year on goal-line situations with a yard to go. This is because of Seattle’s struggles with power blocking.

So now that I've established that Lynch in fact can be stymied, let’s examine what happens if he is on a second down run. The play clock would trickle down to around 21 seconds and Seattle would be forced to call its FINAL timeout. With that in mind, Seattle could conceivably run the ball again here, but it would be incredibly perilous to do so. If this third down run is unsuccessful, the game is likely over. The play clock would run down to around 15 seconds and Seattle would be extremely lucky to get another play off, let alone an effective one. The Super Bowl would end with the Seahawks leaving one play on the field.

With that in mind, what would you do on third down in this situation? I think everyone in their right mind would throw the ball now or attempt to get Wilson out of the pocket. But the thing is, Belichick would have the Patriots keenly aware of this too and, with the way New England’s secondary was blanketing Seattle’s receivers for most of the night, good luck scoring when the Patriots think you’re throwing and you only have 10 yards of the field for your receivers to work with.

And this is where the crux of the issue lies. Carroll and Bevell opted to, in their minds, ensure that they were able to get three tries at one yard. And by throwing the ball on second down, rather than third, they maintained their ability to be creative in their play-calling on potential third and fourth down plays. An unsuccessful Lynch run on second down would have left Seattle with a prisoner’s dilemma: either run it again and not get another play off if the run fails or predictably pass the ball against a great secondary.

Pete Carroll and Darrell Bevell will be chastised for this decision for the rest of their lives, but they shouldn't be. Per Danny Kanell, on the other 108 pass attempts at the one yard line this season, 66 resulted in touchdowns while ZERO resulted in interceptions. The odds of a turnover are even further reduced when you consider the facts and circumstances of the play: the man coverage read was obvious, Malcolm Butler was the targeted cornerback, and Russell Freaking Wilson is your quarterback.

There are only two types of plays that could have truly hurt Seattle in this situation: either one that forced Carroll to take his final timeout or, of course, one that resulted in a turnover. The rational fear of having to take their last timeout eliminated the possibility of the run and the equally rational confidence that a turnover was highly unlikely empowered Bevell and Carroll to pass the ball. A play-action pass was not a strong possibility either, as I've heard some people suggest, because it would expose Seattle to the exact same risk as an unsuccessful run play: that the clock would stop and Seattle would be forced to take its final timeout. Just because the outcome was disastrous does not mean that the play call was cataclysmic. As Russell Westbrook would say, Malcolm Butler just did a good phenomenal and unprecedented job of executing.